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NOTE
Evidence-Cogdill v. Scates: Effect of a Testimonial Admission
by a Party
In Cogdill v. Scates' the North Carolina Supreme Court dealt
with the question whether testimony by a plaintiff that was both
unequivocal and diametrically opposed to the allegations of her complaint precluded her from recovering the damages she claimed despite
the presentation of evidence supporting her right to recover. The
court, carefully limiting its decision to the facts of the case, 2 held that
she was precluded from recovery and reversed a jury verdict in her
favor.
Plaintiff in Codgill was a passenger in a car driven by her husband
that collided with another automobile. Plaintiff filed suit against both
her husband and the driver of the other car alleging that she was injured by their concurrent negligence.' The bases on which she sought
recovery from her husband at trial were (1) that he failed to keep a
proper lookout and operated his car at an excessive speed without
having it under proper control and (2) that he suddenly made a left
turn across the highway without signaling.4
Several actions arising out of the collision were consolidated for
trial in superior court. Evidence was introduced by the other parties
in the action sufficient to support a finding that the drivers of both cars
were negligent.5 In the course of presenting their evidence, two of
the other parties called plaintiff to the stand. While testifying, she
stated that her husband had given a left turn signal and that his car
was sitting still, in the proper lane, waiting for an opportunity to turn
when the collision occurred. Then, in the absence of the jury, she
testified that she had not read her complaint and that if she had she
would not have made several of the statements in it. After consultation
with her attorney and after the return of the jury, she repeated on cross1. 290 N.C. 31, 224 S.E.2d 604 (1976).
2. Id. at 43, 224 S.E.2d at 611.
3. Plaintiff settled out of court with the other driver before trial. Id. at 32, 224
S.E.2d at 605.
4. Plaintiff's complaint originally alleged also that her husband was driving while
intoxicated and in such a manner as to be guilty of careless and reckless driving. Both
these allegations were deleted from the complaint before trial. Id. at 32-33, 224 S.E.2d
at 605.
5. For a summary of this evidence, see id. at 33, 224 S.E.2d at 606.
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examination the substance of her earlier testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the collision.
At the close of presentation of evidence, plaintiff's husband moved
for a directed verdict against her. This motion was denied6 and the case
was sent to the jury, which returned a verdict of forty thousand dollars
for plaintiff.' This judgment was reversed by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals8 in a decision that held that "plaintiff Cogdill is conclusively bound by her unequivocal testimony that her husband . . .was

not negligent in any way . ...I
The North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously upheld the decision of the court of appeals. Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the
court, saw the case generally as a "question to what extent and under
what circumstances a party is bound by his own adverse testimony in
the trial of his case." 1 While the court's statement of the question
was broad, its answer was narrow. After considering a number of rules
of general applicability," the court settled on a rule that had specific
application to the factual situation of Cogdill. When deliberate testimony is given by a party establishing a fact fatal to his case, and a statement is made by his counsel, on inquiry from the trial judge, that he
intends to ,elicit no contradictory testimony, then "'the party and his
counsel advisedly manifest an intention to be bound.' ",12
The court in Cogdill considered itself unconstrained by prior
North Carolina case law in its resolution of the issue of the binding effect of a party's adverse testimony.' 3 Consequently, it looked to courts
6. As was a later motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 38,
224 S.E.2d at 608.
7. The jtry's verdict was inconsistent, awarding damages to every person involved
in the accident including the two drivers whom it found simultaneously negligent and
not contributorily negligent. In the words of the court, the jurors "seem to have assessed
damages on the theory they were dividing the proceeds of no-fault insurance policies,"
Id. at 44, 204 S.E.2d at 612.
8. Cogdill v. Scates, 26 N.C. App. 382, 216 S.E.2d 428 (1975) (Judge Hedrick
dissented on the ground that plaintiff's testimony was not so unequivocal as to require a
directed verdict).
9. Id. at 385-86, 216 S.E.2d at 430.
10. 290 N.C. at 39, 224 S.E.2d at 608.
11. See text accompanying notes 15-25 infra.
12. 290 N.C. at 44, 224 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE § 266, at 638 n.82 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmick]). The facts, as stated by the court, give strong support to the holding.
Plaintiff made her damaging admissions both on voir dire and before the jury. She repeated her testimony after warnings about the consequences of perjury. Her attorney
did not seek remedial testimony; instead, his only action was to assure the court that
if plaintiff said she did not read the complaint, then she did not read it. Id. at 43, 224
S.E.2d at 611.
13. Only two prior cases seem to have given the matter any thought, and neither
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of other jurisdictions and to leading authorities on evidence for guid-

ance. 4 It found three basic approaches to the question, none of which

had been articulated before in North Carolina cases.
The first approach does not differentiate between the testimony

of a party and the testimony of anyone else.'"

A damaging testimonial

admission by a party is thus evidence for the consideration of the trier

of fact. While proponents of this approach recognize that a party's
testimonial admission could be so detrimental to his case that a directed

verdict would be appropriate,' 6 they argue against a rule of general
1
applicability binding the party despite the presence of other evidence. 7
The rationale for this approach has been stated as follows: "Obviously,
the testimony of a party may be incorrect. . . . [A rule that binds
a party who has given incorrect testimony] means, then, that the truth

should not help a [party] who has testified to an error."' 8
The second approach treats the party's testimony as conclusive
against contradiction only "when he testifies unequivocally to matters

'in his own personal knowledge.' "19 This approach thus follows the
first except when a party is testifying to something peculiarly within
his own province. This approach has been most commonly taken in
regard to testimony concerning knowledge2" or motivation, 21 although

it has been extended so far as to include a party's account of the circumof them gave it very much. Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911), and
Ireland v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 349, 38 S.E.2d 206 (1946), both dealt with
the issue of a party's damaging testimonial admissions. They reached opposite results.
The court in Cogdill dismissed Arthur v. Henry as precedent because of its "terse and
imprecise rationale." 290 N.C. at 40, 224 S.E.2d at 609. The same could be said of
Ireland.
14. A good deal of the court's discussion of the law in this area consists of quotation from and summarization of MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 266, at 637-39.
15. This approach is favored by both McCormick and Wigmore. McCoaMIcK,
supra note 12, § 266, at 638; 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2594a, at 601 (3d ed. 1940).
16. "[T]he problem of persuasion may be a difficult one when the party seeks to
explain or contradict his own words, and . . . the trial judge would often be justified
in saying, on motion for directed verdict, that reasonable minds . . . could only believe
that the party's testimony against his interest was true." 290 N.C. at 41, 224 S.E.2d
at 610 (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 266, at 637).
17. If the only evidence a party offers on an issue is his own testimony, and if
that testimony contains an admission fatal to his case, then it makes no difference
whether the admission is treated as binding or non-binding. A directed verdict would
be proper in either case. See Fulghum v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 158 N.C. 555, 74
S.E. 584 (1912).
18. Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
19. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 266, at 637.
20. E.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Payne, 354 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1965); Findlay
v. Rubin Glass and Mirror Co., 350 Mass. 169, 213 N.E.2d 858 (1966).
21. Peterson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 482, 160 N.W.2d 541
(1968).
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stances surrounding an accident.22 The distinction between so-called
"personal knowledge" testimony and other testimony has been justified
as follows: "[W]hen a party testifies to facts in regard to which he has
special knowledge, such as his own motives, purposes, or knowledge,
or his reasons for acting as he did, the possibility that he may be honestly
mistaken disappears. His testimony must either be true or deliberately
23
false."
Finally, some courts refuse to allow any explanation or contradiction of a party's damaging testimonial admission. In effect, the subject of the testimony is removed from controversy in the case. Underlying this third approach seems to be a judicial distaste for allowing a
party to win on a claim whose merits he has contradicted: "[A party]
cannot make out a better case for himself than he himself has testified
to . . . for if this were to be allowed, it would be tantamount to permitting him to say for his own advantage that his own testimony should
be regarded as false, and that of some other witness as true. 2 4 While
in theory this approach is the most severe of the three, it is difficult
to say if the same is true in practice, for the rule has been limited by
numerous exceptions.25
Analytically, the rule accepted in Cogdill and the three approaches considered but bypassed should be measured against the law of
evidence relating to admissions. Admissions have been divided into
two categories by the courts-evidential admissions and judicial admissions. The two are distinguishable definitionally, although in practice more difficulties may arise.
The scope of evidential admissions has been stated rather broadly
as follows: "The rule is universal that whatever a party does or says
shall be evidence against him, to be left to the jury. ' 20 The most obvious evidential admissions are statements made by a party or his
22. Bell v. Harmon, 284 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. App. 1955).
23. Harlow v. Laclair, 82 N.H. 506, 512, 136 A. 128, 131 (1927).

This rationale

has been disputed: "Knowledge may be 'special' without being correct. Often we little
note nor long remember our 'motives, purposes, or knowledge.' There are few, if any,
subjects on which [parties] are infallible." Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328, 332
(D.C. Cir. 1938).
24. Mollman v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 192 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Mo. App. 1946).

25. See Bradshaw v. Stieffel, 230 Miss. 361, 92 So. 2d 565 (1957); MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, § 266. A study of these two sources reveals no fewer than seven major
exceptions to the rule. It is interesting to note that Judge Hedrick of the court of appeals would have applied one of them (equivocal nature of testimony) to Cogdill. See
note 8 supra.
26. McRainy's Ex'rs v. Clark, 4 N.C. 498, 499, Term 698, 699 (1818).
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8
agent.2 7 Beyond the obvious, such things as superseded pleadings
judicial admissions at a prior trial 9 and offers of compromise 30 have
been included within this category. Essentially, however, the hallmarks of evidential admissions are that they are evidence and that they
should be left to the consideration of the trier of fact.
A judicial admission, in contrast to an evidential admission, "is not
evidence, but rather removes the admitted fact from the field of evidence by formally conceding its existence." 31 The most common
methods of making judicial admissions are by pleadings or by stipulations;32 their effect is to prevent the party making them from introducing contradictory evidence and to relieve the opposing party of the
burden of proof on the subject they encompass. 3 A judicial admission
is thus an act 3 4 whose purpose and effect is to remove a subject from
controversy ina trial.
The problem of the effect of a damaging testimonial admission by
a party is thus one of classification. Once a party's testimonial admission is declared either judicial or evidential, 35 the result that should
follow is clear. Evaluation of the approach taken and those not taken
in Cogdill should therefore rest on whether they have correctly classified an admission as judicial or evidential.
Cogdill involved testimony by a plaintiff in direct contradiction to
her complaint; further, she stated that she had not read her complaint
and that she would not have signed it if she had. In the course of this
damaging testimony, she was given an opportunity to consult with her
attorney. Neither she nor her attorney expressed any reservations as
to the truth of her testimony.30 It would seem that plaintiff's deliberate
and repeated statements, in the face of inquiry by the trial judge and
with opportunity to consult with her attorney, expressed an intention

27. On this complex subject, see McCoRMICK, supra note 12, § 267; 2 STANSBURY'S
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE H8 168-171 (2d ed. H. Brandis rev. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as STANSBURY].

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
(1955);
34.

Davis v. Morgan, 228 N.C. 78, 44 S.E.2d 593 (1947).
Allen v. Allen, 213 N.C. 264, 195 S.E. 801 (1938).
American Potato Co. v. Jeanette Bros. Co., 174 N.C. 236, 93 S.E. 795 (1917).
2 STANSBURY, supra note 27, § 166, at 1.
E.g., N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d), 16, 36.
Powers v. Robeson County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 242 N.C. 290, 87 S.E.2d 510
2 STANSBURY, supra note 27, § 166.
This act may be one of omission as well as of commission. See N.C.R. Civ.

P. 8(d).
35. There appears to be no compelling reason for declaring a testimonial admission

by a party sui generis and classifying it as neither.
36. See note 12 supra.
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to deny the averments of her complaint. Her behavior amounted to
a formal concession of the non-existence of the facts on which she
based her complaint. In short, her testimony was in the nature of a
judicial admission,3 7 and the North Carolina Supreme Court was justi38
fied in treating it as such.
The outcome in Cogdill v. Scates is thus arguably correct. There
is, however, still left the question of the approach that should be taken
in less extreme cases. 39 Testimonial admissions by a party are statements. As such, they fall within the broad definition of an evidential
admission-"whatever a party does or says." 40 Short of the Cogdill
situation, they would appear to lack the nature of a formal concession
required for a judicial admission. 4 1 The most logical approach would
therefore seem to be to treat them as what they are-evidence-and
allow them to be weighed by the trier of fact. This use of an admission
is reflected in the first approach discussed in Cogdill.42 When coupled
with the rule adopted in Cogdill to deal with extreme cases, it would
seem to offer the best solution to what has been described as "'one
of the most troublesome questions in the law of evidence .... "143
The second approach to the problem of testimonial admissions by
a party is distinguished from the first by its treatment of statements
from the "personal knowledge" of the party. 44 In terms of classifying
an admission as evidential or judicial, this distinction simply makes no
sense. Further, it can be said of this rule that it rests on a doubtful
rationale 45 and that it has shown a tendency toward over-elasticity."
The third approach noted in Cogdill makes all testimonial admissions by a party binding. 47 This approach thus gives the result of judicial admissions to what are by nature evidential admissions. The
37. For the definition of a judicial admission, see text accompanying note 31 supra.
38. Even Professor McCormick, who in general favors treating testimonial admissions by a party as evidential, would appear to concede the correctness of this result.
McCoRmicK, supra note 12, § 266, at 638 n.82.
39. Two points should be made here. First, the court in Cogdill was careful to
limit its holding to the facts of the case. 290 N.C. at 43, 224 S.E.2d at 611. Second,
the court was emphatic in its rejection of prior North Carolina case law as providing
any precedent of value. See note 13 supra. The case thus marks a starting point without deciding in which direction to proceed.
40. McRainy's Ex'rs v. Clark, 4 N.C. 498, 499, Term 698, 699 (1818).
41. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
42. See 290 N.C. at 41, 224 S.E.2d at 610.
43. Id. at 39, 224 S.E.2d at 608 (quoting 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1040(3) (1964)).
44. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
45. See note 23 supra.
46. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
47. See 290 N.C. at 41, 224 S.E.2d at 610.
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breadth of the rule is compensated for by the number of exceptions
to it. 48 While adoption of this approach might be justifiable if its
rationale were unassailable, such is not the case.49 Moreover, the
number of exceptions to this rule raises a serious question about whether
it could be administered fairly and uniformly. 0
The decision in Cogdill v. Scates is a good one when applied to
the narrow factual situation with which it dealt. As precedent, it represents more than anything else the road not taken. It should not be
misread as adopting for North Carolina a rule that testimonial admissions by a party should be treated as judicial admissions. It did not.
If, however, the rule it adopted is combined in future cases with a rule
treating other testimonial admissions by parties as evidential admissions, Cogdill v.Scates would represent an important step in the development of a coherent, well-articulated law of evidence relating to
admissions in North Carolina.
DEWEY MICHAEL JONES

48. See note 25 supra.
49. "The underlying notion [of a rule that makes a party's testimony binding]
seems to be that a party who has testified incorrectly should be punished by losing his
case. But if he has committed perjury he should not be punished without trial, and if
he has not committed perjury he should not be punished at all." Alamo v. Del Rosario,
98 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
50. Cf. Cogdill v. Scates, 26 N.C. App. at 387, 216 S.E.2d at 431 (Hedrick J., dissenting) (this dissent-on the ground that plaintiff's testimory was not unequivocalis one demonstration of the inconsistency that can follow from the application of the
many exceptions to the rule).

